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LUTHER’S EXISTENTIAL IMAGO DEI, THE DEPRIVATION THESIS,
AND SANCTITY OF LIFE
Tyler M. John
Cedarville University, Cedarville, OH, USA

Abstract
• Some bioethicists, like Helga Kuhse and Peter
Singer, question the defensibility of the Sanctity of
Life doctrine
• According to Kuhse and Singer, the doctrine
depends on the attribution of moral status to a
morally irrelevant property: Species
• But resourcing Martin Luther’s conception of imago
Dei and the Deprivation Thesis may provide morally
relevant support for Sanctity of Life
• Traditionally, the Sanctity of Life doctrine has
depended upon the imago Dei for support
• Accordingly, the imago Dei is supposed to be a
property that:
a) qualitatively separates all human persons from
all non-human animals

Some Helpful Resources
Luther:
“Therefore my understanding of the image of
God is this: that Adam had it in his being and
that he not only knew God and believed that He
was good, but that he also lived in a life that was
wholly godly.”
“But Adam lived in supreme bliss and in freedom
from fear; he was not afraid of fire, of water, or of
the other discomforts…”
Peterson:
“First of all, Luther argues that the image of God
provided Adam with the clearest and purest
experience of life. This applied to both his
spiritual and physical existence. Second, Adam
had no fear of death or other anxiety.”
My Formulation of Luther’s imago Dei:

b) makes human persons of far greater moral
worth than non-human animals.
My solution:
• I will look to the theology of Martin Luther as well as
the deprivation thesis, and argue that Luther’s
doctrine of imago Dei is successful in meeting the
joint conditions challenged by Kuhse and Singer,
and successful in showing why it might be ipso facto
morally worse to kill a human than a non-human
animal.

iD: For any creature p, p is in the imago Dei IFF it is
causally possible for p to have an aesthetic
experience of God e.

A Solution
1. All conscious humans and entities that will be
conscious humans in the future can have an
aesthetic experience of God. (Luther)
2. No non-human animals can have an aesthetic
experience of God.
3. Thus, all conscious humans and entities that will be
conscious humans in the future, and no non-human
animals can have an aesthetic experience of God.
(1,2)
4. For any conscious human or entity that will be a
conscious human in the future p, it is causally
possible for p to have an aesthetic experience of
God, and for any non-human animal q, it is not
causally possible for q to have an aesthetic
experience of God. (3)
5. Some aesthetic experiences of God are immense
goods for those who have aesthetic experiences of
God.
6. If some event in p’s life e is good for p, then e
makes p’s life more morally valuable than it would
have been, all other things being equal, if e were
not an event in p’s life.

The Deprivation Thesis
7. If (4), (5), and (6), then iD’ is possibly true:
• On the Deprivation Thesis, death is bad for a
person because, in Jeff McMahan’s words, “it
[excludes] what would be good for a person –
namely continuing to exist.”
• Thus, if a person dies, she is deprived of the good
life she would have had had she continued living.
• To state this in a non-decorative terms:
If p dies at t and thereby goes out of existence, p
fails to incur any goods and harms that she would
have incurred after t in the closest possible world in
which p does not die at t.
So, killing is pro tanto wrong on the deprivation thesis
because it causes the deprivation of goods.

iD’: For any conscious human or entity that will be
a conscious human in the future p, p bears the
property iD. Thus, it is causally possible for p to
have an extrinsically good aesthetic experience of
God e. p’s possibly having an e makes p’s future l
ife more morally valuable than the lives of
non-human animals q for which it is not causally
possible for q to have an extrinsically good
aesthetic experience of God.

Implications
1. Sanctity of Life is true. At least for those
humans that can have conscious experiences,
and, perhaps, for fetuses too.
2. Severely cognitively impaired humans are
in the imago Dei.
3. It might be morally impermissible to cease
care. This seems bad, but there may be ways
out of this problem.
4. The lives of “mystics” might be more
morally valuable than the lives of “nonmystics”. If “e’s” happen more among some
group of people a than among b, aren’t the
lives of the people in a more valuable than
those in b? This seems counter-intuitive, but it
might be okay to bite this bullet. If not, there
may be ways out of this problem.
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8. So, iD’ is possibly true. (4,5,6,7)
• iD’ is a property that:
a) qualitatively separates all human persons from
all non-human animals
b) makes human persons of far greater moral
worth than non-human animals.
So, the Sanctity of Life doctrine is defensible.
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